The short name or acronym of the protocol

Apple-Google

In case multiple versions of the protocol exist, indicate the version number
1.2

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Technical descriptions/white papers describing the protocol. Provide one or more web addresses (one per line)

https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotification-BluetoothSpecificationv1.2.pdf
https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotification-CryptographySpecificationv1.2.pdf
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/exposurenotification

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If the protocol has been formally verified, provide a pointer to the proof and/or articles or paper(s) describing those efforts

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Undisclosed. Information subject to copyright. All rights reserved.

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People in the same location cannot be correlated to each other based on data sent upstream

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References for the field 'Co-location cannot be inferred'

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Temporary IDs are generated and stored client-side

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Assurance that future encounters will not be compromised by knowledge of current encounter

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Assurance that past encounters are not be compromised by knowledge of current encounter

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Attackers cannot trigger externally observable effects involving users they did not encounter

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Messages exchanged contain an adequate integrity check

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Users cannot broadcast identifiers they did not originate or were assigned

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Can a malicious user impersonate others by replaying broadcasted signals

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A passive adversary with physical proximity is unable to capture information not present IRL

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When users are near for multipe consecutive time slots, the combined data cannot be used to infer the length of an encounter.

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Users who transmit reports never as a result reveal information to users they did not themselves come into contact with.

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Users can retrieve updates concerning their medical status without revealing information to anyone

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Different keys of the same user cannot be feasibly linked in any way by a passive observer which is able to gather a set of sufficient size by continued observation

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No leaks of information to other apps through timing analysis

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Can the user control the pruning behaviour of the recorded contacts? As in, can data that is no longer relevant be set to be automatically removed?

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The time window of every contact is registered

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If the protocol has a home page on the web, add the URL
https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/

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If the protocol has a separate logo, please upload

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Tags:
Created by Michiel Leenaars on 2020/05/19 14:17
    
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