This is a comparison matrix of different protocols for contact tracing applications. These protocols were produced by different teams from around the world, from vastly different cultural backgrounds and with different design goals. A protocol may or may not portable outside of a certain legal context. Different design goals obviously result in vastly different architectural decisions. The goal of this feature matrix is to give an overview of the problem and solution space across all of these efforts. There is a great deal to be learned from how others autonomously tackle the same or similar issues.


How to use this feature matrix

It allows to compare different properties of proposed protocols and protocol variants. (There is a separate comparison matrix for apps and devices themselves). Each horizontal row represents a feature or property, while each column represents a protocol specification. Certain attributes have a negative connotation, these marker buttons are demarcated by the color red. Others are linked to desired or positive features, demarcated by the color green. And yet others are neutral, these are blue. When you hover over a marker button, you will see an explanation of the attribute it is linked to.

If a certain property is not yet known, it is shown as a blue button with a question mark. If you want to help out, click on such a blue button. This brings you to a new page where you can edit the data. Look into the protocol paper in question and fill out the missing information you can find. Please  provide a proper reference just below it, so others can easily verify your findings. Thanks for your help!

How editing works

You can edit the features and properties below by clicking on them and in the following screen click the edit button in the top right. This will take you to an editing environment where you can change information, preview your edit, add a summary of what you changed and more. Note that these edits take place in a staging environment. This means that your additions and changes are first reviewed by our editors before the information is updated on the wiki.

DP-3T Apple-Google BlueTrace ROBERT DESIRE TCN
Protocol Version

2020-04-12

1.2

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.4.1

Protocol Whitepaper

https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf

https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotification-BluetoothSpecificationv1.2.pdf
https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotification-CryptographySpecificationv1.2.pdf
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/exposurenotification

https://bluetrace.io/static/bluetrace_whitepaper-938063656596c104632def383eb33b3c.pdf

https://github.com/ROBERT-proximity-tracing/documents

https://github.com/3rd-ways-for-EU-exposure-notification/project-DESIRE/raw/master/DESIRE-specification-EN-v1_0.pdf

https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN

Formal verifications of the protocol

https://blog.symbolic.software/2020/04/05/dp-3t-verifpal/

? ? ? ?

https://source.symbolic.software/verifpal/verifpal/-/blob/master/examples/cen.vp

Authors

EPFL: Prof. Carmela Troncoso, Prof. Mathias Payer, Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Prof. Marcel Salathé, Prof. James Larus, Prof. Edouard Bugnion, Dr. Wouter Lueks, Theresa Stadler, Dr. Apostolos Pyrgelis, Dr. Daniele Antonioli, Ludovic Barman, Sylvain Chatel
ETHZ: Prof. Kenneth Paterson, Prof. Srdjan Capkun, Prof. David Basin, Dr. Jan Beutel, Dennis Jackson
KU Leuven: Prof. Bart Preneel, Prof. Nigel Smart, Dr. Dave Singelee, Dr. Aysajan Abidin
TU Delft: Prof. Seda Gürses
University College London: Dr. Michael Veale
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security: Prof. Cas Cremers, Prof. Michael Backes
University of Oxford: Dr. Reuben Binns
University of Torino / ISI Foundation: Prof. Ciro Cattuto
University of Salerno: Prof. Giuseppe Persiano
IMDEA Software: Prof. Dario Fiore
University of Porto (FCUP) and INESC TEC: Prof. Manuel Barbosa
Stanford Univerity: Prof. Dan Boneh

Undisclosed. Information subject to copyright. All rights reserved.

Bay, Jason; Kek, Joel; Tan, Alvin Tan; Hau, Chai Sheng; Yongquan, Lai; Tan, Janice; Anh Quy, Tang

INRIA PRIVATICS; Fraunhofer AISEC

Claude Castelluccia, Nataliia Bielova, Antoine Boutet, Mathieu Cunche, Cedric Lauradoux, Daniel Le Métayer and Vincent Roca.

Niyogi, Sourabh; Petrie,James; Leibrand, Scott; Gallagher, Jack; Hamish; Eder, Manu; Szabo, Zsombor; Danezis, George (UCL); Miers, Ian; De Valence, Henry; Reusche, Daniel

Co-location cannot be inferred ? ? ? ? x
Private temporary ID ? ? x ? ?
Forward Secrecy ? ? ? ?
Backward Secrecy ? ? ? ?
No externally observable effects ? ? ? x ?
Source Integrity ? ? ? ? x ?
Broadcast Origin Integrity ? ? ? ? ?
Resistance against replay and ghosting attacks ? ? x ? ?
No Passive Tracking ? ? ? ? ?
Can the length of a meetup between people be derived externally by combining exported data from multiple time slots ? ? ? ? x ?
Reporter Privacy ? ? ? ? x ?
Information Recipient Privacy ? ? ? ? x ?
No linkability of keys ? ? ? x ?
Use of constant time cryptography only ? ? ? ? ? ?
User-configurable automated pruning ? ? x ? x ?
Server Trust requirements ? ? ? ?
Records (estimated) contact duration ? ? ? ? ?
Home page

https://github.com/DP-3T/documents

https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/

https://bluetrace.io

https://github.com/ROBERT-proximity-tracing/documents

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02570382/

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Logo

dp3t.jpg

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Something missing?

If there is a property missing, please contact us through one of the communication channels or leave a comment below.

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Created by Michiel Leenaars on 2020/05/19 13:25
    
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